CRANE'S FOOTNOTE THIRTY-SEVEN

GETS THE BOOT
INTRODUCTION
Without question one of the most persistent problems in tax law
involves the determination of the character of a transaction. Even
though a taxpayer has not so much as placed a "for sale" sign on his
property, a gift or abandonment of the property may be deemed a sale
for income tax purposes.1 When a taxpayer incurs a loss, sale classification can be disastrous because the taxpayer may be denied the
2
added benefits of ordinary loss treatment.
The abandonment versus sale problem revealed itself in Freeland
v. Commissioner.3 In Freeland the Tax Court held that the voluntary return of devalued nonrecourse property to a mortgagee was
essentially equivalent to a sale. 4 The decision reversed caselaw dating
to the 1940's, relying on the oft-cited Crane v. Commissioner,5 and
rejected the taxpayers' plea that Crane's footnote 37 provided an
exception to sale classification. 6 This comment will attempt to aid
the tax practitioner by explaining the basis for the Tax Court's decision in Freeland and clarifying a narrow yet confusing area of tax
law.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END: CRANE V. COMMISSIONER
Perhaps more than any tax decision since the ratification of the
sixteenth amendment, the Crane case has earned a reputation as an
unending source of law review commentary, tax law debate, and
judicial ulcers. Crane's notoriety is derived not only from the judicially determined fate of poor widow Crane, but also from the very
questions raised by the court that was supposed to answer them. 7 In
the course of espousing the doctrine that the amount realized upon the
sale of property includes the nonrecourse liability to which the property is subject, 8 the Supreme Court opened the proverbial Pandora's
box by giving birth to the infamous footnote 37.'

1 E.g.,

Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 C.B. 158.

2 I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1222.

74 T.C. 970 (1980).
Id. at 982.
331 U.S. 1 (1947).
8 74 T.C. at 981-82.
7 Id. at 975.
331 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 14 n.37. Professor Bittker recognizes note 37 as "the most famous footnote in tax
history." Bittker, Tax Shelters, Non Recourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REV. 277,
277 (1978). In its entirety, note 37 reads as follows:
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Although the ramifications of Crane and footnote 37 may at
times appear muddled, the pertinent facts giving rise to the controversy are clear. When Mr. Crane died in 1932, he left to his wife an
apartment building and lot subject to a principal mortgage of
$255,000 and interest in arrears.' 0 Mrs. Crane held the property for
seven years during which time she claimed depreciation deductions on
the apartment building totaling $28,045.10, effectively adjusting the
When Mrs. Crane sold the
basis of the building to $178,997.40."
property for $2,500 subject to the unassumed mortgage, she reported
only the cash received as capital gain.' 2 Mrs. Crane failed to give
effect to the transfer of the mortgage, reasoning that she sold in 1938
that which she had acquired in 1932-the equity in her husband's
3
property. '
The Commissioner disputed Mrs. Crane's computations.' 4 He
maintained that Mrs. Crane's taxable gain amounted to $23,767.03,
and argued that the property which she possessed was the tangible
property and not simply the equity. 5 Treating the sale of the land
and the building as separate transactions, the Commissioner computed Mrs. Crane's gain on the sale of the building by subtracting the
adjusted basis of the property from the sum of the principal amount of
the mortgage and the cash received, less the amount of the selling
price allocable to the land.' 6 The Commissioner determined that the
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage,
a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the
mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without
receiving boot. That is not this case.
331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
'0 331 U.S. at 3. The unpaid interest amounted to $7,042.50.
Id. at 3-4. The appraised value of the property in 1932 was $262,042.50, with $55,000
allocable to land. The remaining amount of $207,045.50 was allocated to the building. For the
actual calculations, see note 16 infa.
l1 331 U.S. at 3. Mrs. Crane treated the transaction as a sale of a capital asset pursuant to
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, § 117(a)-(b), 52 Stat. 447 (currently I.R.C. § 1221). Accordingly, she reported only 50% of the realized gain as taxable income. 331 U.S. at 3-4.
"1 331 U.S. at 3. Mrs. Crane contended that the equity had a zero basis. Id. at 3-4. The
Court noted, however, that Mrs. Crane's claim that she owned only the equity in the property
was manifestly inconsistent with her depreciation of the property, since anything containing a
zero basis cannot be depreciated. Id. at 3 n.2.
, Id. at 4.
15 Id.
10

Id. The computations are as follows:
original basis of building
207,042.50
depreciation
- 28,045.10
178,997.40

adjusted basis of building

[(mortgage + boot = $257,500) - ($54,471.15 sale price of land)] - [$178,997.40 adjusted
basis] = ordinary gain of $24,031.45.
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building was not a capital asset, thus the gain realized on the sale of
the building was ordinary income.' 7 By including the value of the
mortgage debt in the amount realized, the Commissioner reasoned
that Mrs. Crane sustained an ordinary gain of $24,031.45 on the sale
In addition, he determined that Mrs. Crane realof the building.'
of
$528.85
with respect to the sale of the land, 50 percent of
ized a loss
which was recognizable as a capital loss because the land was characterized as a capital asset.' 9
The rest is history. The Supreme Court determined that Mrs.
Crane inherited not merely the equity in the property, but "the land
and buildings themselves, or the owner's legal rights in them, undiminished by the mortgage." 2 0 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the unadjusted basis of the property was the 1932 appraised value of
$262,042.50.21 Finding that the apartment building was property
subject to adjustment for exhaustion and wear and tear, the Court
also agreed with the Commissioner that depreciation deductions allowed during the seven years Mrs. Crane held the property reduced its
22
adjusted basis to $178,997.40 at the time of sale.
Addressing the problem that made the Crane decision famous,
the Court held that the amount realized by Mrs. Crane included not
only the $2,500 cash received on the sale, but also the amount of the
nonrecourse mortgage to which the property was subject.2 3 Noting
first that the property sold by Mrs. Crane must have been the same
property she inherited in 1932, the Court termed absurd Mrs. Crane's
claim that she realized only $2,500 on the sale of property worth one
hundred times that value.2 4 Recognizing "the reality that an owner
of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property
will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as
if they were his personal obligations," the Court determined that
17 Id. at

5.

18 Id.

19Id. In an order expunging a deficiency assessed against Mrs. Crane, the Tax Court found
principally for the taxpayer, concurring with the Commissioner only with respect to the noncapital nature of the building. Id. On appeal by the Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed after considering the merit of the Tax Court's decision that Mrs. Crane
was taxable only on the $2,500 she received when she sold the property. Commissioner v. Crane,
153 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2 331 U.S. at 6.
21 Id. at 11. The Court supported its conclusion by differentiating between the definitions of
"property" and "equity," and by determining that an equity basis would be inconsistent with
principles of tax depreciation. Id. at 8-11.
22 Id. at 11.
23 See id.at 14.
24 Id. at 12-13. Since the Court had already rejected Mrs. Crane's contention that what she
inherited was merely the equity in the property, it would have been anomalous for the Court to
accept her argument that she sold only the equity in the property. See id. at 13.
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upon the sale of property, an owner realizes an economic benefit
equal to the sum of the mortgage and additional consideration or boot
25
paid.
Although the Court's position is consistent with tax law's fondness for symmetry, the means chosen to reach the end has been the
subject of repeated criticism and debate. 26 More than one commentator has viewed the Court's economic benefit rationale as extraneous
to the decision,2 7 particularly in light of the Court's admission that the
real issue in the case was "whether ,the law permits [Mrs. Crane] to
exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing
gain. 12 8 Applied in the context of a sale in which the fair market
value of property sold has fallen below the value of its nonrecourse
mortgage, the economic benefit theory yields confusing results. 2 It is
difficult to conceive of a taxpayer benefiting from a discharge of
30
liability when no personal liability ever existed.
Without addressing the issue specifically, in footnote 37 the
Crane Court acknowledged a potential problem in situations where
property is abandoned or disposed of subject to a mortgage and without boot. 3' In its celebrated but puzzling footnote, the Court recognized that a seller of nonrecourse property "cannot realize a benefit
equal to the mortgage" if the mortgage debt is greater than the
property's fair market value. 32 Whether this observation was intended as a general exception to the Crane rule or merely intended as
a demonstration of the Court's understanding of Crane'sfar-reaching
ramifications cannot be gleaned from the opinion. It is clear, however, that Crane opened as many doors as it closed, leading the way
for endless judicial and scholarly speculation.

Id. at 14.
2' See, e.g., Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundariesof the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REV. 159 (1966); Bittker, supra note 9; DelCotto, Basis and
Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1969).
27 See Bittker, supra note 9, at 284; DelCotto, supra note 26, at 84185. Professors Bittker and
DelCotto, while agreeing with Crane's result, have separately attacked the economic benefit
theory set out by the Court. Both have suggested that the quandary created by Crane's reliance
on a taxpayer's receipt of an economic benefit upon the disposition of property could be resolved
by replacing the economic benefit theory with one based entirely on tax benefit principles.
Bittker, supra note 9, at 284; DelCotto, supra note 26, at 85. See also Adams, supra note 26, at
169-70.
28 331 U.S. at 15.
29 See Bittker, supra note 9, at 282, 284; DelCotto, supra note 26, at 85.
3 Bittker, supra note 9, at 284.
3' See note 9 supra.
32 Id.
25

19811
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THE REALIZATION PROBLEM
While some have viewed footnote 37 as a last chance escape from
the iron-fisted grasp of the Crane rule, others see it as little more than
dictum.3 3 When the fair market value of property falls below that of
its nonrecourse mortgage, the problem of whether the amount realized from a sale or other disposition includes the full value of the debt,
or as hinted at by footnote 37, merely the value of the land, has never
been resolved by the Supreme Court. The Treasury Department and
the Tax Court, however, have quietly ended much34of the debate by
dismissing taxpayers' footnote 37-styled arguments.
The Service's concern that footnote 37 not be made an exception
to the Crane rule is understandable. Footnote 37, read literally,
would provide a two-fold opportunity for taxpayer windfall. 35 If the
amount realized by a taxpayer selling or disposing of depreciable
property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage were limited to the value
of the property, the taxpayer could enjoy the benefit of a tax loss when
the property value falls below the face amount of the mortgage,
irrespective of prior depreciation deductions. 3 A comparable situation develops if a taxpayer is entitled to deduct losses incurred through
ownership of the property.3 7 Both situations permit a taxpayer to
include the mortgage in the property's basis and take depreciation or
loss deductions on the mortgaged property, while never requiring the
38
taxpayer to include those deductions in income.
Similar taxpayer windfall will result when the taxpayer is allowed to borrow cash against appreciated property by increasing the
face value of his nonrecourse mortgage debt.39 If the property's
market value should reverse its upward climb and fall below the value
of the mortgage, application of footnote 37, upon the transfer of the
property subject to the outstanding mortgage, would permit the taxpayer to avoid ever paying tax on the borrowed cash. 40 In either case
of taxpayer windfall, if the property's mortgage is greater than its
adjusted basis, the taxpayer has profited from the property's devalua-

3 Compare Cleveland, Foreclosure abandonmentand settlement: the tax efjects on mortgagors, THE TAx ADvIsoR, Feb. 1978, at 70 with Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
649, 655 (1951), af']'d, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
31 See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979); Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1981).
35 See Bittker, supra note 9, at 284.
36Id.

37 Id.
38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.
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tion by indefinitely postponing recognition of accrued economic
41
gain.
Thus, while footnote 37 made sense in the context of Crane's
economic benefit theory,4 2 its application as a general exception to the
Crane rule creates obvious problems. 43 Recognizing the possible ramifications of footnote 37, the Internal Revenue Service treated the
problem by avoiding it. The Commissioner took the position that in
transfers where the value of property is below that of its nonrecourse
mortgage the amount realized nevertheless includes the full amount of
outstanding debt attached to the property. 44 The Service's position
was not without some support. In Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,45 the Tax Court questioned the validity of the Crane footnote by referring to it as dictum, though the Court concluded that
46
footnote 37 did not apply to the situation before it.
Twenty years after the Tax Court's cursory reference to footnote
37 in Woodsam Associates, the judiciary has finally elevated the Service's position to something more than an opinion. 47 In Millar v.
Commissioner,48 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
41 See generally id.
42 331 U.S. at 14.

4' Bittker, supra note 9, at 283-84.
See Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. In Revenue Ruling 76-111 the Service commented
on the federal income tax consequences of a buyer's transfer of cattle to a seller in return for
cancellation of debt owed to the seller. Even though the value of the herds had fallen below that
of the amount owed to the seller, the Service concluded that:
Whatever inference may be drawn from footnote 37 in the Crane case, the
unpaid balance on the sales contracts, which indebtedness was cancelled upon the
transfer of the herds . . . is the amount realized by the taxpayers on such sales . . .
regardless of the fair market value of the herds at the time of their return to the
seller.
Id.
45 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
46 Id. at 655.
41 See Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979). See also Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
756 (1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1981). Prior to the Treasury Department's promulgation of §
1.1001-2 and the Tax Court's decisions in Estate of Delman, Millar, and Tufts it was still feasible
for taxpayers to rely on footnote 37 as a justification for using fair market value rather than the
outstanding amount of nonrecourse debt as a measure of the taxpayer's amount realized when
the taxpayer transferred the property subject to the mortgage without additional consideration.
See Cleveland, supra note 33, at 70. Although the Service's long standing position has been that
the amount realized from a sale or disposition always includes the full amount of debt attached
to the property, see Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214; note 44 supra, revenue rulings are not
authoritative. The Treasury Regulations point out that "Revenue Rulings... do not have the
force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations . . . but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that
purpose." Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (1981).
4- 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978).
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the taxpayers' reliance on footnote 37. 41 In that case the taxpayers'
nonrecourse obligations were secured by stock in a Subchapter S
corporation. 50 They argued that upon foreclosure and surrender of
the stock in exchange for cancellation of the indebtedness, their
amount realized was limited to the value of the stock. 5' The taxpayers reasoned that because the amount of the debt was greater than
the value of the stock pledged against it, footnote 37 shielded them
52
from realization of gain on the transaction.
Affirming the decision of the Tax Court, 53 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit found that footnote 37 failed to provide taxpayers with their hoped-for exception to the Crane rule. 54 The court
looked to the rationale of Crane for support, determining that the
Commissioner's calculation of taxpayers' gain was consistent with the
primary motivation underlying Crane.55 Since the taxpayers were
permitted to include the loans in the basis of their stock for purposes of
deducting losses and expenses, the court recognized that it would be
incongruous for the taxpayers to exclude the amount of the loans from
their amount realized.- 6 Furthermore, while the court acknowledged
that the taxpayers had indeed presented a footnote 37 situation, it
refused to perceive the footnote as anything more than a "hypothetical
57
observation" lacking the authority or color of law.
The court was once again challenged by the dilemma of footnote
37 in Tuft v. Commissioner.58 Battling from his familiar corner of
49

Id. at 215-16.

Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656, 657 (1977).
51 577 F.2d at 214.
52 Id. The basis of the stock, which was zero, was increased by the amount of the loans
borrowed by the taxpayers and subsequently contributed as capital in the corporation, resulting
in a basis of $245,000 for the taxpayers' stock. Id. at 215. The basis of the stock was further
adjusted by net operating losses and deductions claimed by the taxpayers, consequently establishing $39,492 as the stock's final adjusted basis. Id. The Commissioner calculated a gain of
$205,508 by treating the total outstanding nonrecourse debt as the amount realized and subtracted from it the adjusted basis of the stock. Id. See I.R.C. § 1001. Taxpayers, conversely,
claimed they realized no gain because the value of the stock was less than the amount of debt
outstanding. 577 F.2d at 214.
53 Mifar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), afJ'd, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978). The court
of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's decision on all points except for the Tax Court's imposition
of a penalty for failure to recapture investment credits. 577 F.2d at 216.
577 F.2d at 215-16.
Id. at 215.
5
id.
5

57

Id.

- 70 T.C. 756 (1978). Tufts involved the sale of taxpayers' interests in a partnership which
owned a Texas apartment complex. Id. at 757-58, 761. At the time of sale the apartment
complex was valued at $1,400,000 although it was subject to liabilities of $1,851,500. The
contributed capital totaled $44,212. Id. at 761. In addition, from 1970 through 1972 the
individual partners had reported depreciation expenses and ordinary losses in connection with
partnership assets totaling $439,972, effectively resulting in the partnership having an adjusted
basis of $1,455,740 when sold. Id. at 762.
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the ring, the Commissioner argued that upon the sale of partnership
interests the amount realized by the taxpayers included partnership
nonrecourse liability, the fair market value of the property sold being
inconsequential. 59 The taxpayers relied on Crane and footnote 37,
maintaining that no economic benefit accrues beyond the fair market
value of the property sold.6 0 In its decision the court avoided the
catch-22 presented by the economic benefit analysis of Crane by
emphasizing the taxpayers' prior realization of tax benefits through
loss deductions connected with the property. 6' The court observed
that but for the taxpayers' inclusion of the loans in the partnership
basis, the taxpayers would not have been entitled to most of the
claimed deductions since their distributive shares of partnership losses
were confined to the adjusted basis of their interest in the partnership. 6 2 Consequently, the court held that the amount realized by the
taxpayers included the full amount of the nonrecourse liability to
which the partnership interests were subject regardless of the interests'
63
fair market value.
Recently adopted treasury regulations in accord with the decisions in Millar and Tufts have undoubtedly buried the dispute concerning the amount realized in a footnote 37 situation. 4 Consistent
with the Service's long standing position, the regulations state simply
that the fair market value of property has no effect on the amount
realized from a sale or disposition. 65 By noting that the rule prevails
even where the fair market value of property is less than the debt it
secures, the regulations have effectively eliminated the footnote 37
defense in the context of realization. 6 Although one might have
presumed that the saga of footnote 37 had come to an abrupt and

59 Id. at 763.

Id. at 764.
81 Id. at 765. See also notes 28 & 30 supra.
11 70 T.C. at 769-70. I.R.C. § 704(d) provides that -[a] partner's distributive share of
partnership loss (including capital loss) shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of
such partner's interest in the partnership at the end of the partnership year in which such loss
occurred. "
83 70 T.C. at 770. The decisions in Millar and Tufts were followed by the Tax Court in
Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 29 (1979). In Delman the court rejected the
taxpayers' contention that footnote 37 shielded the taxpayers from realizing gain from the
repossession of equipment subject to nonrecourse liabilities. Id. at 28-29. The taxpayers argued
that footnote 37 applied because the fair market value of the repossessed equipment was less than
the amount of the outstanding nonrecourse debt. Id. The court found, however, that the
rationales of Millar and Tufts applied and held that the amount realized from the repossession of
the equipment included the full amount of nonrecourse indebtedness. Id. at 30.
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)-(b) (1981).
Id. § 1.1001-2(b).
id.

1981]

COMMENTS

timely halt, it did not end here. The Commissioner would have to
enter the ring once more to erase the spindly aftermath of a few
fleeting comments uttered by the Court in 1947.67
SALE OR EXCHANGE CLASSIFICATION AND
THE DEMISE OF THE FOOTNOTE 37 DEFENSE
A taxpayer transferring property to a mortgagee or a third party
in order to avoid liability must take into account not only his amount
realized, but also whether the transaction is a sale or exchange.6 8 If
the taxpayer experiences gain on the transfer he will naturally be
eager to classify the conveyance as a sale or exchange. 69 In a footnote
37 situation in which the value of nondepreciable property has
dropped below the amount of its outstanding nonrecourse mortgage,
the taxpayer will frequently incur a loss since the devaluation of the
property is the very reason for disposing of it. 70 Sale or exchange
71
classification in that case is obviously undesirable.
When the Crane Court decided that Mrs. Crane's amount realized included the value of the outstanding nonrecourse mortgage
covering her property, sale or exchange was not at issue because it was
clear that Mrs. Crane has received additional consideration for the
property which had been sold subject to the mortgage.7 2 Consequently, when the Court observed in footnote 37 that it might have
confronted an entirely different situation had Mrs. Crane abandoned
or transferred her property without receiving boot, the Court spoke
primarily in the context of determining Mrs. Crane's amount realized. 73 In the years following Crane, commentators mused over
Crane's effect on sale or exchange 74 because it remained unclear
whether the Crane rule also provided a basis for sale or exchange
classification, particularly in footnote 37 situations in which property
was abandoned or transferred without boot. 75 Tufts, Millar, and
See Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980).
See I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1211, 1222.
" Id. § 1202.
70 Cf. [1977] TAX MNCM'T (BNA) A-9 (result similar to that of foreclosure sale; taxpayers
abandoning or transferring property without consideration do so because property cannot be
sold profitably). See also Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173 (1947).
"' See IR. C. § 1211.
'2 331 U.S. at 3; 74 T.C. at 978.
71 74 T.C. at 978.
" E.g., Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAxEs 719, 733 (1975). "In light of the Crane
decision . . . it is fair to question whether the voluntary conveyance of encumbered property
escapes sale or exchange characterization." Id.
15 Compare Pratt & Oestreich,
The Voluntary Transfer of Real Estate to Creditors: Is It
Treated Like "Abandonment" or Foreclosure?. 57 TAXES 293, 296, 300 (1979) with Cleveland,
Voluntary Conveyances: Sales or Exchanges?. 57 T~xEs 287, 291, 292 (1979).
17

8
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recently promulgated Treasury Regulations ended the debate about
whether footnote 37 provided a general exception to Crane's realization rule. 76 Additional clarification of the Crane doctrine was required, however, to determine whether the rationale of Crane provided the consideration needed to classify a transaction as a sale or
exchange, and whether footnote 37 would provide a general exception
77
to such a finding.
A. Pre-Crane Decisions
Prior to its decision in Crane, the Supreme Court held in
78
that a loss sustained from the foreclosure of
Helvering v. Hamme1
property was a capital loss. 79 In Hammel and its companion case
Electro-Chemical Co. v. Commissioner,8" the Court refused to acknowledge any distinction between a voluntary and involuntary
sale. 8 Recognizing that it was not Congress' intention to allow a
deduction in full for losses sustained upon a foreclosure sale while
permitting only partial taxation of gains similarly incurred,8 2 the
Court concluded that losses resulting from involuntary foreclosure
were subject to sale or exchange classification. 83 Shortly thereafter
the Court in Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co.,84
extended the Hammel rationale to a forced tax sale 8 5 even though the
taxpayer bore no personal liability for the delinquent taxes and received no consideration in return. 86
During the period preceding Crane in which the Supreme Court
decided Hammel and Nebraska Bridge, the Board of Tax Appeals and
later the Tax Court decided a series of cases holding that losses sustained from the abandonment or voluntary transfer of property subject to nonrecourse debt were deductible in full from ordinary in-

76 Millar, 577 F.2d at 215-16; Tufts, 70 T.C. at 770; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)-(b).
77 74 T.C. at 978.
78 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
71

Id. at 512.

311
81311
82 Id.
83 Id.

U.S. 513 (1941).
U.S. at 508.
at 509.
at 511.

- 312 U.S. 666 (1941) (per curiam).
85 Id. at 667.
88 See Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 115 F.2d 288, 291 (8th Cir.
1940), rev'd per curiam, 312 U.S. 666 (1941). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
there was no sale or exchange. Id. at 290. The taxpayer neither received consideration nor was
relieved of an indebtedness since under Arkansas law property owners were not personally liable
for property taxes. Id. In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court cited
Hammel and Electro-Chemical. 312 U.S. at 667.
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come.8 7 As long as the taxpayer received no consideration upon the
transfer of the property, the taxpayer succeeded in avoiding sale or
exchange classification which would surely have followed had the
taxpayer waited for foreclosure of his property. 8 In Jamison v.
Commissioner,8 a case which exemplifies the sentiments of the Tax
Court during that time, the Commissioner tenaciously argued that
such transfers were essentially equivalent to the foreclosure sale of
Hammel.90 The Tax Court differed with the Commissioner, however, distinguishing Hammel and holding that the taxpayer incurred
ordinary rather than capital losses. 9 1
In Jamison, the taxpayer transferred property subject to outstanding nonrecourse liability to the appropriate taxing authorities
92
because he no longer believed the property to be worth the taxes.
The conveyances were voluntarily made and the taxpayer accepted no
consideration. 3 Cognizant of differences between the facts in Hammel and the instant case, the Jamison court observed that while in
Hammel title passed by means of a forced foreclosure sale, in Jamison
title was voluntarily passed.9 4 In addition, the actual occurrence of a
sale, which the Supreme Court found to be critical in Hammel, was
missing in Jamison.9 5
Once the Jamison court distinguished Hammel, it was free to rely
on the precept, first established by the Board of Tax Appeals in
6 and followed thereafter by
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner"
97
various circuit courts, that losses sustained from the voluntary conveyance of property were deductible in full from ordinary income.9 8
Citing Commonwealth, the Tax Court concluded that since the
owners of the property were not personally liable for the indebtedness
11 Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173, 181 (1947); Lapsley v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A.
1105, 1110 (1941); Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970, 976 (1940); Commonwealth, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 850, 853 (1937). Accord, Stokes v. Commssioner, 124 F.2d 335, 338
(3d Cir. 1941).
" Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173, 177 (1947).
89 8 T.C. 173 (1947).
10 Id. at 176, 181. In Jamison the court traced the development of the sale or exchange
exception in the context of abandonment and effectively contrasted abandonment with foreclosure. Id. at 176-81. As a result, the decision has been often cited by both courts and commentators when discussing the "voluntary conveyance v. sale or exchange" issue. E.g., Fox v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 704, 715 n.7 (1974); Cleveland, supra note 75, at 291.
91 8 T.C. at 177.
92 Id. at 174-75.
93

Id.

Id. at 176-77.
o' See id. at 177.
36 B.T.A. 850 (1937).
0' E.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941).
98 8 T.C. at 178-81.
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and the properties were not exchanged for a dollar value, the transactions were without consideration. 9 The failure of consideration precluded a finding that the voluntary conveyance of the property constituted a sale or exchange. 0 0 Accordingly, the court held that the
taxpayer sustained ordinary losses upon the transfer of property.' 0'
The determination in Jamison was relied upon by the Tax Court
as recently as 1974,102 but its precedential value has often been ques03
tioned in the wake of Crane.1
Since Crane held that the taxpayer's
amount realized included the value of nonrecourse liabilities attached
to the property, critics have argued that it would be inconsonant not
to treat that same amount as consideration for purposes of determining sale or exchange. 0 4 While the Internal Revenue Service and
commentators took the position that Crane had vitiated the authority
0 5 the Tax Court stood
of Jamison,1
patiently in the wings, waiting
perhaps for the resolution of footnote 37's validity. °1
The sale or exchange issue ordinarily surfaces when the taxpayer
experiences a loss upon the disposition of property subject to nonrecourse debt, which incidentally is also the setting of a footnote 37
problem. 0 7 Had the Tax Court reevaluated the Jamison issue prior
to its decisions in Millar and Tufts, the court would have been placed
in the precarious position of also having to decide whether footnote 37

9 Id. at 177.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 181.
102 Fox v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 704, 715 n.7 (1974).
103 Lenway v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 620, 628 n.9 (1978). "It is arguable whether these cases
continue to have their original vitality in light of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court
in Crane v. Commissioner.. ."Id. (citation omitted). See Ginsburg, supra note 74.
104 Lenway v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 620, 637 (1978) (Fay, J., dissenting). See Pratt &
Oestreich, supra note 75, at 296.
105 See Pratt & Oestreich, supra note 75, at 296. See also Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264;
Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. Although in two Revenue Rulings the Internal Revenue
Service failed to specifically mention Jamison, Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264; Rev. Rul.
76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, the Service analyzed the sale or exchange issue in the aftermath of
Crane, noting that "[i]t
is well established that, for Federal income tax purposes, the transfer of
assets in consideration of a cancellation of indebtedness is equivalent to a sale upon which gain or
loss is recognized." Id. at 215.
The Service concluded that when a taxpayer purchased cattle herds and remained indebted
to the seller for the balance of the purchase price only to the extent of the value of the herds
pledged as security, the voluntary return of the herds to the seller constituted a sale. Id. at
214-15. The Service gave no credence to the possibility that Crane's footnote 37 created exceptions where the value of the security transferred was less than the debt owed, nor did the Service
acknowledge case law which was directly contra to the Service's ruling. Id.
106Although Crane was decided in 1947, the sale or exchange debate was not resolved until
the Tax Court decided Freeland.
107 E.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941); Freeland v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 970 (1980); Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173 (1947).
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provided an exception to the Crane rule, and as a result, created an
exception to a finding of sale or exchange in a Jamison situation.
No doubt when the Tax Court in Freelandreexamined the Jamison issue in light of Crane, Millar, and Tufts, its task was eased by the
prior judicial resolution that the amount realized upon the disposition
of property included the value of nonrecourse debt to which the
08
property was subject, regardless of the property's fair market value. 1
At the same time, while the Commissioner discounted the footnote 37
defense, 109 Crane and its famous footnote had yet to be tested in the
context of a judicial determination of the character of a transaction
and case law weighed in the taxpayer's favor.' 10
B. Freeland v. Commissioner: Resolution of the Sale or
Exchange Dilemma
Freelandresolved the last of a succession of problems innocently
created by the Supreme Court in 1947."'1 In 1968 taxpayers Eugene
and Mary Freeland purchased unimproved land in California for
$50,000, making a downpayment of $9,000 and providing for the
balance with a note ensured by a purchase money deed of trust.112 By
1975, however, the value of the land had dropped to $27,000 while
the outstanding balance on the note remained $41,000. 113 For all
practical purposes the taxpayers considered the property worthless,
thus they conveyed the land to the seller. 114 The taxpayers received
no consideration for the transfer and at that time a foreclosure sale
was not pending."l 5 Eugene and Mary Freeland reported an ordinary
loss in connection with the transfer of the property on their 1975
federal income tax return. The Commissioner disputed not the
amount of the loss, but rather its characterization." 8
In Freeland the sole issue before the Tax Court was whether the
taxpayers' voluntary conveyance of their nonrecourse property to the
seller amounted to a sale. 117 The Commissioner argued that since
there is no substantive distinction between a situation in which the
108See Millar,

577 F.2d at 215; Tufts, 70 T.C. at 770.

0 Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264; Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
"I See Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941); Jamison v. Commissioner, 8
T.C. 173 (1947); Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 850 (1937).
"1 74 T.C. at 975, 982-83.
112 Id. at 971.
"I Id. at 972.
114 Id.

115 Id.

116Id. at 973.
"I1 Id. at 974.
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creditor forecloses upon the property and one in which he takes the
property by voluntary conveyance in lieu of foreclosure, the transfer
by the taxpayers ought to be treated as a sale under the authority of
Hammel."18 Conversely, the taxpayers argued that case law precedent required a finding of ordinary loss. 19
Although the court initially acknowledged that not every transaction is a sale or exchange, it confirmed the well established rule that
a sale is imputed when a taxpayer who is personally liable for an
outstanding mortgage debt conveys his property in satisfaction of the
mortgage.' 20 Examining the Supreme Court's Hammel and Nebraska
Bridge decisions, the court also noted the attribution of a sale when a
taxpayer's property is disposed of by foreclosure or tax sale.' 2' Moreover, the court observed that Hammel's interpretation of congressional intent required that the terms "sale or exchange" be liberally
construed rather than confined "to the standard transfer of property
by one person to another in exchange for a stated consideration in
22
money or in money's worth."
As much as the outcome of Mr. and Mrs. Freeland's conveyance
resembled the result of a foreclosure sale, the court still had to contend
with the series of pre-Crane decisions which held that voluntary
conveyances were not sales or exchanges.' 2 3 The rationale of preCrane authority emphasized the lack of requisite consideration when
property subject to nonrecourse debt had been voluntarily transferred
without boot.' 2 4 Accordingly, the Tax Court in Freelandapproached
the problem from the perspective of ascertaining whether sufficient
consideration existed to support a sale or exchange.' 2 5 After reviewing Crane and the qualifications presented in Tufts and Millar, the
Freeland court concluded that the rationale of Crane provided the
necessary consideration for a finding of sale or exchange which was
missing in Jamison and similar decisions.' 26 Crane's realization principle established that "relief from indebtedness" was sufficient consid118Id. at 974; Brief for Respondent at 7, 11, Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980).
11974 T.C. at 974; Brief for Petitioners at 18, 20, Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970

(1980).

74 T.C. at 974-76.
M2Id. at 976-77.

120

'12

Id. at 980.

123See id. at 977.
124

Id.

125Id. at 980-81. The court noted, however, that in Russo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 135
(1977), the Tax Court held that consideration was irrelevant for purposes of sale or exchange. 74
T.C. at 980-81. Even though this conclusion may have followed from Hammel, the Freeland
court analyzed the sale or exchange issue in terms of finding consideration since case law on the
subject had traditionally done so. Id. at 981.
1" 74 T.C. at 980.
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eration to warrant classifying the transaction as a sale.1 27 As long as
there was an amount realized there was consideration.' 2 s
The Freelands' reliance on footnote 37 as an exception to sale or
exchange classification was also without avail.'12
The court, categorizing the footnote as mere dictum, explained that Tufts and Millar
had disposed of the argument that there is no amount realized where
the value of property is less than the amount of the nonrecourse
mortgage attached to it.' 30 Because footnote 37 failed to reduce the
amount of indebtedness included in the calculation of gain or loss,
footnote 37 could not be depended upon to avoid having that same
amount support a "sale or exchange."' 3' The Freelands failed to
persuade the court that footnote 37 created an exception to a finding
of sale or exchange. 32 Accordingly, the court held that since the
Freelands' voluntary conveyance of land subject to nonrecourse debt
was essentially equivalent to a foreclosure sale,' 33 the transfer was a
sale governed by the capital assets provision of the Internal Revenue
Code. '3
Thus, the court specifically overruled Jamison and three
other pre-Crane decisions. 35
Given the tenor of tax law in current years, the Freeland court
36
in remarking that their decision was not unexpected.'
correct
was
Whether or not one agrees with Freeland'soutcome, the court's introduction of clarity into a field of disorder is surely welcome. The
Freeland decision follows a uniform approach to the sale or exchange
aspect of the Crane rule and has effectively laid to rest all traces of a
very confusing Supreme Court footnote. In the process of achieving its
desirable result, however, the court glossed over some relatively important points.
"7 Id. at 981.

M, Id. at 981-82.
ld. at 978-79, 981-82.
I,
'I Id. at 978-79.
I3'at 981.
Id.
131 See id. at 978, 981.
113 Id. at 981. The three other cases reversed by the Freeland court were Lapsley v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1105 (1941); Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1941) and Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 850 (1937).
'" 74 T.C. at 982-83.
'35 Id. at 982.
'13 Id. The court stated:
[T]here has been sufficient change in the judicial thinking on this subject, as
evidenced by the cases decided since 1941, to cast considerable doubt on the validity
of those decisions, and it would be wrong for us to ignore the more recent approaches to this issue simply to adhere to that doctrine, . . .the vitality of those cases
has been sapped before this, and the handwriting has been on the wall long before
today.
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Although the rationale in Crane was based in part on an economic benefit theory,137 the Court's primary intention was to avoid
the effect of double tax benefits that resulted when a taxpayer included nonrecourse debt in his basis for depreciation purposes but
failed to include it in his amount realized upon the disposition of the
property. 38 Consistent with the substance of Crane, Millar and
Tufts both held that footnote 37 did not present an exception to the
Crane determination. 39 Accordingly, taxpayers could no longer receive a windfall by including nonrecourse debt in their basis for
depreciation purposes and excluding that debt from their amount
realized upon the disposition of their devalued property.140 In
Freeland, however, where the dispute involved the conveyance of
land, no double benefits or tax windfall could be expected from
disposition of the property.141 Still, the court applied the precepts of
Crane as interpreted by Millar and Tufts in holding that the transaction was a sale.142 When Millar and Tufts rejected the position that
there is no amount realized when the fair market value of the taxpayer's property is less than the nonrecourse mortgage to which it is
subject, strict adherence to Crane's economic benefit theory was bypassed enabling the courts to defer to Crane's abhorrence of double
tax benefits. 43 There being no possibility of taxpayer windfall in
Freeland, the reason for the court's reliance on Millar and Tufts in
rejecting footnote 37 as an exception to sale classification and its
failure to address the economic benefit theory espoused in Crane is
obscure. Perhaps the Tax Court's avoidance of Crane's economic
benefit theory indicates a tacit rejection of an oft criticized concept in
favor of an uncomplicated generalized rule.
As questions remain and debate no doubt continues surrounding the
application of Crane's dual rationales, it is at least clear that Freeland
has ended one chapter in the continuing saga of Crane. The taxpayer
is forewarned that a voluntary conveyance of property subject to
nonrecourse debt, even if the taxpayer receives no economic advantage, will result in sale or exchange.
Linda G. Harvey
See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
See note 29 supra.
74 T.C. at 979.
4 Id. See also notes 55 & 64 supra and accompanying text.
141 Since the basis in the Freeland's property remained unchanged from the time of purchase
until the time of reconveyance to the seller and no additional funds were borrowed by utilizing
the property as collateral, the Freeland's transfer did not resurrect the evil that the Crane Court
intended to prevent. See 74 T.C. at 973 n.2. See also notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
142 74 T.C. at 981.
143 See Millar, 577 F.2d at 215; Tufts, 70 T.C. at 764-66.
137

"3
131

